Overt soliciting for parental resources, primarily food, is often explained as having evolved to express the fitness gain a signaling offspring would derive from a favorable parental response. This Signal of Need model makes 4 unheralded assumptions: 1) that parents' life-history objective is egalitarian; 2) that contemporaneous siblings participate nepotistically; 3) that dependent young can assess their own reproductive value from internal sources; and 4) that the morphological and behavioral signals we call ''begging'' are essential for transferring such cryptic information reliably. We review 2 parsimonious alternative types of honest begging. First, if the life-history assumption is relaxed, solicitation signals may be positively correlated with reproductive value, obviating the nepotism assumption. According to this Signal of Quality logic, solicitation signals can be seen as typical handicaptype advertisements of personal merit. Second, by relaxing the assumptions concerning cryptic fitness information entirely, solicitation signals might be purely proximate Signals of Hunger, with parents basing their overriding life-history decisions on nonsignal information streams (ecological costs of foraging plus offspring cues already in the public domain). These 3 hypotheses are easily testable, along with existing models that do not require parents to have complete control over resources.
INTRODUCTION
A fter getting the worm and returning to its nest, the proverbial early bird is greeted with cacophonous squawks, colorful open mouths, and jostling nestlings. This scene invites questions about whether such offspring behavior is energetically excessive, perhaps dangerously conspicuous. Ubiquitous and taxonomically diverse-solicitation analogs can be found in birds, mammals, insects, plants, and even leeches, pretty much wherever care-giving adults make recurring deliveries to dependent young-exuberant begging seems to demand a functional explanation. The offspring traits that influence parental investment range from very subtle (e.g., chemical compounds from fruits that are developing properly) to extreme (e.g., siblicidal aggression), combining numerous behavioral, physiological, and morphological phenotypes (reviewed in Budden and Wright 2001; Wells 2003; Kilner and Hinde 2008) . Although such traits are also used to solicit a few commodities other than nutrition (e.g., parental warmth, see Evans 1994; Weary and Fraser 1995) , most studies focus on food because offspring fitness is often limited by rapid growth and development (Lack 1947; Clutton-Brock 1991; . Parents respond in myriad ways as well, frequently adjusting total food deliveries (''provisioning'') or skewing resource distribution among nest mates (''allocating''); alternatively, parents may ignore these traits entirely. And because of the incomplete overlap of evolutionary interests among close kin, the subject of begging has emerged as a crucible for testing theoretical predictions about offspring signals and parental responses. Here, we argue that the scope of inquiry has narrowed prematurely around one signaling model for parent-offspring communication, and we offer an expanded framework with some constructive steps forward.
Young offspring have limited means of influencing the quantity, quality, and distribution of parental care. Their tactical repertoire falls into 3 natural groups. Only one of these, ''physical competition,'' deals directly with nest mates (if such exist) and involves outmaneuvering sibling rivals for limited resources (e.g., taking advantageous position where food transfer is likely, intimidating nest mates, etc.). The other 2 categories hinge on influencing parental behavior, and we follow the communication terminology of , Maynard Smith and Harper (2003) , and others, by distinguishing between true ''signals'' (behavior and morphology apparently shaped by selection for eliciting desired responses) and ''cues'' (traits that evolved for other functions but provide information that others find useful). Confusion sometimes arises from a blurring of physical competition and cues (e.g., if parents are influenced by observing which offspring prevail in fights or outhustle siblings for position), but neither of these categories evolved primarily to inform parents, so they can be set aside as we seek to understand the signals that did. By this usage, offspring solicitation signals include all vocalizations, ritualized postures, ornaments, and volitional chemical releases but not the cues of body size, general vigor, and uncontrolled odors. For example, nestling birds must open their mouths before parents can insert food, so that simple act is not specialized for communication, but gaping does qualify as a signal if accompanied by specialized social enhancements (vocalizations, colors, etc.) . When we ask why gaping is performed, we are interested in the information borne by this display and how the interests of sender and receiver are affected.
At least 3 distinct theoretical approaches have been applied to how offspring solicitation signals affect parental care. The most popular models rest on the simplifying assumption that parents enjoy total proximate control over the provisioning and allocating of food, basing their decisions largely on information assimilated from offspring signals. Parents are thus seen as having the power of ''active choice'' that parallels how females choose sexual partners according to their own aesthetic preferences and life-history circumstances. The 2 other classes of signaling models differ in this key assumption, as both demote the role of parents to making only ''passive choices'' in the face of offspring control of signal expression. Specifically, in Scramble Begging models, offspring engage in sensory competition for parental notice, signals being the vehicle by which each makes itself conspicuous ; for an empirical example, see Dugas and Rosenthal 2010) . No particular information is postulated as being encoded within them. By contrast, Sibling Negotiation models assume cryptic condition as message content, but nest mates are assumed to play both the roles of signal sender and receiver in deciding among themselves which should receive the next unit of investment before the delivering parent merely complies with that verdict (Roulin 2002) .
Here, we recognize 3 active parental-choice hypotheses, which differ primarily in the nature of the information conveyed by offspring signals and secondarily in terms of what parents and nest mates are striving to accomplish. In principle, controlling parents might base investment decisions on solicitation signals that express: 1) the degree to which a given contribution can improve the sender's fitness (i.e., the signal expresses an offspring's need, ; 2) the fact that the sender is an especially promising vehicle for the production of grand-offspring (advertising an offspring's worthiness, ); or 3) nothing whatever about the sender's reproductive value but merely something of a more proximate nature .
SIGNALS OF NEED
Godfray (1991) brought the active-choice approach to begging in an elegant mathematical model showing how a single offspring might use signals to provide parents with cryptic information about its state/condition and thereby influence investment. This was followed with a fuller treatment accommodating 2 (or more) contemporaneous siblings . From the starting premise of total parental control, Godfray's model demonstrates that begging can be stable if 1) an offspring chooses a strength of signal revealing its personal condition (specifically its level of need, the marginal fitness benefit it can gain from receiving more resource); 2) its parent responds positively to the signal's strength (e.g., brings more food when signal intensity is escalated); and 3) signal performance is so costly as to reflect the sender's condition reliably (any marginal value of further resources that might be extracted through deceitful exaggeration being nullified by this extra expenditure). In short, the Signal of Need (SoN) model posits that an offspring expresses its level of need ''honestly'' and is rewarded by parental solicitude that improves its condition (lowers its need), profiting both offspring and parent.
Although not the first theoretical treatment of begging, Godfray's SoN model quickly stimulated substantial empirical and theoretical research (Figure 1 ), such that a book-length review of this formerly dormant topic was merited within a decade . As a theoretical model, SoN performed its primary function admirably, sketching a plausible explanation for begging signals. Specifically, it demonstrated the logic by which begging might work if its components all work as postulated (''the level of offspring solicitation can be a true reflection of offspring need as long as solicitation is costly and the benefits of extra resources increase with need,' , leaving open the rather important matter of whether begging does, in fact, function in this manner. Thus, the matter rests, as usual, on whether the assumptions are realistic.
A SHORT HISTORY OF BEGGING AND PARENTAL CHOICE
Current interest in offspring solicitation is easily traced to a few theoretical roots, and the historical progression is instructive for understanding the current scene. The first flush of theoretical interest emerged from Trivers's (1974) verbal and graphical presentation of parent-offspring conflict, which asserted forcefully that offspring of sexual species must not be ''implicitly assumed to be passive vessels into which parents pour the appropriate care.'' His unexpected notion of offspring empowerment through psychological manipulation was carried to its logical extreme by first assuming total offspring control of begging signal strength in the Scramble Begging models (reviewed in . In the process, Trivers introduced the issue of signal honesty: Noting that a nursing calf ''cannot fling its mother to the ground and suckle at will,'' he proposed ''deceit'' (exaggerating the degree to which investment is truly required) as a psychological weapon for extracting more than is in parental interests to supply. It follows that the first wave of signaling models explored what an offspring should do if running the whole show (reviewed in Parker et al. 1989 .
It is natural that a second generation of parental-choice models would eventually explore the reverse assumption (parents wielding all decision-making power over who gets fed), essentially returning the pendulum to its pre-Trivers position. Meanwhile, a parallel discussion of exaggerated versus deceptive signaling loomed in sexual selection. Darwin's argument that extreme courtship ornaments and displays are limited by countervailing natural selection offered an early explanation for how further signal exaggeration is held in check. Zahavi's handicap principle extended this point considerably, contending that the existence of a balancing point between these opposing selection processes means that signals, however hypertrophied, must necessarily demonstrate the signaler's true quality. As Zahavi (1975, p. 209) put it, ''the value of many characters may reside in their action as testing devices.'' However, because this argument was also expressed only in verbal and graphical forms (with associated lack of precision), it met with extended skepticism, especially when efforts to test it mathematically failed to generate support (e.g., Maynard Smith 1976; Kirkpatrick 1986 ). Largely neglected for more than a decade, handicap logic was eventually ). Grafen's landmark paper built interest in applying handicaps not only to sexual traits in animals and plants but also to other signaling contexts. In a largely overlooked Other Interpretations section, Grafen (1990, p. 527) directly addressed offspring begging as follows: ''We apply the model by supposing that the parent wishes to feed the best growing chicks so as not to waste food on the sick.'' Thus, the very first honest begging model assumed that parents prefer promising offspring over inferior nest mates: Here, an offspring performs Signals of Quality (SoQ) to advertise its good condition. Given Grafen's precedent, it is somewhat surprising that the SoN argument-currently recognized by most authors as the only ''honest begging'' model-took precisely the opposite tack. After crediting Zahavi (and Grafen) for the signal-cost assumption, Godfray (1991, p. 328 ) made the crucial assumption ''that a parent is selected to give more resources to young in poor condition,'' thereby neatly inverting the focal message conveyed in offspring signals, positing that offspring escalate their signals when needy, and deescalate when strong. Thus, SoN contravened the routine assumption for sexually selected traits (that they demonstrate a performer's positive features). In brief, the handicap logic of SoQ rests on signals being positively condition dependent; that of SoN makes them negatively condition dependent. Both types of condition dependence can be evolutionarily stable and honest ), but SoN requires that additional assumptions be met (typically that the signal receivers and rivals have appropriate fitness stakes in the welfare of the signaler). This inversion of message was derived from Maynard Smith's (1991) Sir Philip Sidney game, a model spotlighting how asymmetries in benefits can drive kin-selected altruism . The colorful back-story featured the severely wounded Sir Philip Sidney after the Battle of Zutphen in 1586, directing that his water bottle be passed to a more severely wounded (i.e., needier) soldier with the words ''Thy necessity is yet greater than mine'' (Maynard Smith 1991) . If one overlooks the slightly awkward fact that these 2 soldiers were not genetic kin (Maynard Smith and Harper 2003) , the model's lesson is merely that differences in the potential benefits (expressed as degree of need) from a social act can easily determine whether br . c. Thus, Hamilton's rule remains firmly in charge: When its inequality is satisfied, altruism between kin, including that predicated on asymmetrical neediness, is favored. This was not the first time this fundamental relationship between need and Hamilton's b had been made (see Hamilton 1964, p. 16; Dawkins 1975, p. 128; Parker et al. 1989, p. 847) , but it proved extraordinarily influential. Applied to offspring signals, the infectious idea of begging based on need quickly generated widespread enthusiasm.
PROBLEMS SURROUNDING ''CRYPTIC NEED''
Godfray (1991) stipulated that begging signals express the offspring's cryptic condition. He made it abundantly clear that ''condition'' was a synonym for reproductive value (''offspring in poorer condition have lower fitness,'' p. 328) and used ''need'' as its antonym. Furthermore, the expressed condition/need of the signaler was required to be cryptic (see also Grafen 1990) , ostensibly because the fitness information conveyed to the parent would diminish sharply in value if leaked simultaneously via cues (Krebs 2002) , which are noncryptic, by definition. After all, a hypothesis intending to explain how selection produced costly signals would be greatly compromised if parents already had access to such predictors. By signaling its cryptic need, the offspring informs parents about the contribution a food delivery would make to the signaler's marginal fitness . Thus, a nestling in high condition has low need and displays with reduced vigor; one in maximal condition should not beg at all Figure 1) .
Measuring an offspring's potential fitness is extremely difficult in the first place and requiring that such be revealed importantly through signals per se adds to the empiricist's challenge when testing SoN. Conceding that point (''by its very nature, cryptic need is difficult to measure''), Godfray (1995, p. 20) suggested that ''it may be possible to identify correlates of hidden condition.'' So far, this has proven elusive, and most researchers have turned to 2 proxies. Some have related solicitation signals to a plausible fitness proxy like body size or physical development (e.g., avian plumage), citing various studies that link these traits to viability (for references relating fledging mass to recruitment in 22 bird species, see Schwagmeyer and Mock 2008) . Unfortunately, as highly accessible cues, these features are not cryptic, thus undermine the postulated value of the begging signal. A greater number of workers have relied instead on the proxy of hunger (operationally defined as time since last feeding), attractively cryptic but not linked convincingly to viability. As various authors have noted (e.g., Saino et al. 2000) , a fatally diseased nestling is easily surfeited without improving its chance of breeding, whereas a nest mate enjoying ''maximum condition'' can be made hungry in short order without jeopardizing its reproductive future. In its essence, the gulf between what an organism wants and what it truly needs is that between proximate and ultimate levels of explanation (see Wells 2003) , an as-yet unresolved matter for begging (see Appendix).
Regrettably, the backbone of empirical support for SoN is comprised of numerous variations on one theme that can be labeled collectively as the ''hunger experiment.'' A common protocol involves depriving young subjects of food before quantifying signal intensity (e.g., calling rate, postures, latency to gape, etc.) as a function of time without food. In field versions of this, subjects are manipulated so as to be unable to ingest food (e.g., via neck ligature) and videotaped during delivery visits by their parents; in the more common laboratory version, deprived subjects are tested at regular intervals (e.g., every 10 min) with artificial stimuli (e.g., taped sounds of an arriving parent and/or physical tapping on nestling bills). To date, deprivation experiments have been performed on dozens of species (insects, mammals, and birds) and virtually always produce the expected positive result. In short, it seems as if the hunger effect is solid and unlikely to benefit much from further documentation: The physiological complex that we call hunger inspires escalated solicitations across a wide array of taxa. However, as noted above, hunger is not clearly related to fitness, hence to Godfray's meaning of need (e.g., , reviewed in Clark 2002 . It is unfortunate, therefore, that some authors use hunger and need as synonyms (e.g., Leonard and Horn 1996; Weary et al. 1996; Kilner and Johnstone 1997; Manser et al. 2008) , occasionally even mixing the terms within a single sentence (e.g., ''. . .in canaries, nestling mouth colour functions to signal need by becoming more intensely coloured with increasing food deprivation,' ' Kilner 1997, p. 966-967) . In this context, a new experimental approach, whereby an orally administered appetite stimulant can be used to decouple hunger and condition experimentally, may prove especially useful for future work (Martín-Galvéz et al. forthcoming) .
To summarize thus far, SoN is currently the only widely recognized hypothesis for active parental choice . One of its 3 basic components has been consistently supported (in nearly all cases, parents do respond positively to stronger signals), although that feature is equally predicted by passive-choice models .
A second premise, that signals express cryptic need, currently stands on shakier ground because hunger is a dubious proxy for fitness. And the third requirement, that signals are sufficiently costly, has been reviewed many times (e.g., Chappell and Bachman 2002; Haskell 2002; Wells 2003; Moreno-Rueda 2007; Számadó 2011) without much consensus (e.g., . The central issue there is not whether signals have any detectable cost whatever, which has been demonstrated repeatedly in terms of energetics (Chappell and Bachman 2002) and risk from predators (Haskell 2002) , but ''whether the costs are sufficient to enforce signal reliability'' (Searcy and Nowicki 2005, p. 132) . That is, there are always efficacy costs (for transmission), so the key matter of strategic costs (sensu Maynard Smith and Harper 2003) for maintaining honesty must be isolated. As well, some question remains as to whether any strategic costs are essential for maintaining signal honesty (reviewed in Wells 2003; Searcy and Nowicki 2005) . Finally, because active parental choice seems to be intrinsically appealing (especially, when offspring are very young, hence too small and feeble to challenge parental control), we suspect that the popularity of SoN derives in part from the dearth of recognized active-choice alternatives.
Finally, the SoN model contains a frequently overlooked module of sibling altruism (explicitly noted by that merits closer attention. Accepting for sake of argument that signaling is costly and that 2 concurrent nest mates vary in condition, it follows that the one in better condition is better able to afford escalated signals (or is indifferent to the food). If this stronger/high-condition sibling (represented in Figure 2 by H) opts not to exercise its physical advantages, thereby allowing its more limited/low-condition nest mate (represented by L) to express its greater need effectively, the incentive for such self-restraint presumably derives from the indirect fitness reward. It is easy to show (Figure 2a ) that such reticence profits the senior sibling whenever its marginal personal gain from the next unit of parental investment is less than half that available to its full sibling (e.g., Hamilton 1964; Parker et al. 1989) . Conversely, we see 2 general contexts in which nepotistic self-restraint is not predicted. First, if the 2 siblings are so evenly matched in condition that Hamilton's rule is not satisfied (i.e., if 2H# , L#), then the senior sib gains more from selfpromotion and should use its superior capacity to out-signal a lesser rival (Figure 2a) . Second, if a minimum amount of parental investment must be received before either offspring achieves any viability (PI min in Figure 2b ), the magnitude of that start-up investment materializes as a threat to nepotism. A senior sibling may have no indirect fitness incentives until its nest mate reaches PI min , which is likely to take several days (e.g., passerines) or weeks (e.g., eagles and seabirds), during which delay hegemonic parental control of allocation may have Figure 2 (a) Standard decelerating cumulative gain curve (thick lines) for offspring fitness as a function of parental investment. Two siblings are illustrated, one currently in higher condition (fitness ¼ W H ) by virtue of having received more parental investment (P H ) to that point than its lower condition nest mate. At the moment depicted on the left panel, the marginal gain rates (shown as thin tangents) are such that L# . 2H#, so the high-condition sibling benefits more if the next unit of parental investment goes to its low-condition full sibling. Under these circumstances, H should demur from begging and SoN can operate. In the right panel, by contrast, L# , 2H#, so the high-condition sibling adds more to its inclusive fitness by trying to obtain the next unit of investment. Here, H is better off begging or using physical competition on behalf of its personal well being. (b) If the fitness curve does not rise immediately with the start of parental investment but rests at zero until some threshold amount has been received, the dynamic between these same hypothetical siblings can differ dramatically from the above diagram. Let PI min represent the down payment that parents must pour into an offspring before any fitness return can be realized. Here, it is apparent that a highcondition sibling may be paired with a nest mate that may not have reached the PI min threshold, in which case its marginal gain rate cannot be twice as steep (L# ¼ 0). By the time that both siblings are showing enough promise to make SoN operate properly, the active-choice system may or may not still be in effect and any sibling nepotism shown after that is unlikely to be signal based.
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Behavioral Ecology lapsed. This delay problem is also exacerbated if the function is sigmoidal (slow to accelerate) rather than steeply decelerating . Such reduced incentives for nepotism have long been cited for understanding early obligate siblicide in raptors (Stinson 1979; reviewed in Mock and Parker 1997) .
DYNAMIC PROBLEM, STATIC MODEL
Although it has been noted repeatedly that a dynamic games modeling approach is needed to add realism to iterative parental care Johnstone 1996; Bonabeau et al. 1998; Budden and Wright 2001; Searcy and Nowicki 2005; Jeon 2008; Kilner and Hinde 2008; ), this point is frequently missed. As a result, SoN is often viewed as a general ruleof-thumb that parents apply steadily throughout the period of offspring dependence rather than shifting continually. The resulting logic trap is easily exposed: If parents of multioffspring broods were to allocate food consistently to whichever offspring is currently most needy, then even accidental intrabrood variation in nest mate condition would be ''repaired'' quickly. From there, it follows that parents would hardly trouble themselves to create sibling disparities intentionally. Instead, all siblings would reach independence together as a closely matched set and density-dependent mortality, that is, brood reduction, would be rare (allowing for individual instances where the SoN system faltered). Parents with inadequate resources would methodically underfeed all their young, producing runt fledglings with dim future prospects, if not whole-brood starvation (Davis et al. 1999) . Clearly, this is not what happens in nature, where numerous field studies show parents overtly favoring core offspring (e.g., Forbes et al. 1997; ) whose initial size advantages are often engineered by parents themselves. Certainly, brood reduction befalls a substantial proportion of avian families (Lack 1947; O'Connor 1978; . And the widespread preference of avian parents for larger nestlings is presumably a principal behavioral rule used by Old World cuckoos exploiting host parents. We know of no immediate prospects for a truly dynamic game model of begging but suggest that interim progress can be made on the general problem by contemplating in a less formal way how the various players (parents plus offspring in different levels of condition) are most likely to maximize fitness. Specifically, begging is overdue for an infusion of lifehistory thinking, and several excellent models already exist as guides (Haig 1990; Bonabeau et al. 1998; Jeon 2008) .
The first step is to shed any assumptions that parents necessarily have the goal of raising all their young. It has been known for many decades (Lack 1947 ) that brood reduction can be so valuable to parents that they often create sibling disparities to facilitate its implementation. Efficient brood reduction is the abettor of another widespread life-history trait, parental overproduction (Kozlowski and Stearns 1989; Mock and Forbes 1995) . Parents gain several fitness advantages by initially creating an optimistic family size (hedging against various uncertainties) that routinely proves too large while also structuring the brood in advance of any adaptive pruning. Because of overproduction, resources are habitually stretched thin and local resource (i.e., sibling) competition overrules relatedness . Such contexts are inimical to the SoN views that parents automatically favor the neediest offspring or that stronger nest mates should submerge their personal interests. In fairness, explicitly restricted SoN to ''a narrow range'' of offspring condition (above the parent's abandonment threshold) for addressing how solicitation signals operate and mentioned the mathematical caveat of local (not global) stability. When the SoN approach was later expanded to accommodate broods of 2 , the intermediate option of terminating one offspring and diverting the emancipated parental investment to the other was not addressed fully, and later workers have seemed to assume whole-brood survival as the parents' life-history objective.
ACTIVE-CHOICE ALTERNATIVES TO SoN
For starters, Grafen's Signal of Quality (SoQ) hypothesis must be revived, applying the original handicap logic that signalers advertise merit rather than expressing need. It is unclear why this simple and attractive alternative to SoN has been almost totally neglected (for rare exceptions, see Weary and Fraser 1995; Saino et al. 2000) ; perhaps the word ''begging'' connoted impressions of pleading rather than boasting. The SoQ interpretation has high-condition offspring emitting stronger signals (which they can better afford), and the positive parental response (more food to stronger signalers) skews investment toward progeny with the greatest reproductive value. If the family budget is tight, this places limited resources where they will bring the richest fitness returns (e.g., numbers of grand offspring). Worded differently, SoQ minimizes the parents' wasting investment on lost causes. Positively condition-dependent signals inspire parental favoritism through a positive feedback loop. Here, brood reduction may be routine, or junior siblings may receive enough to thrive when seniors approach satiety (nature's version of ''trickle-down economics''). One common observation that seems curiously at odds with SoQ is the muchdocumented hunger effect on solicitation strength. Because the beneficiaries of a positive feedback loop are least likely to be hungry, the fact that food deprivation really does inspire escalated signaling does not fit in an obvious way to the SoQ argument. (As noted earlier, the hunger effect does not fit especially well with SoN either but blurring the distinction between offspring proximate-level wants and ultimate-level needs has obfuscated that.).
Recent studies offer bird and insect results somewhat easier to reconcile with SoQ than with SoN. For example, total food amounts (provisioning rates) predict fledging size and eventual recruitment as breeders in a house sparrow (Passer domesticus) population (Schwagmeyer and Mock 2008) , where brood reduction is both common (42% of 1000 broods) and so early (median 4 days posthatching) that parents still have full control and total brood demand is unlikely to have outstripped parental provisioning capacity. At this age, videotaped parents actively skew allocations toward larger siblings (Mock et al. 2009 ). Furthermore, broods receiving supplemental nutrients solicit more loudly, receive 25% more total food (mainly from the normally slacking male parent), and probably recruit more often into the breeding population (Mock et al. 2005) . When nestling mouth flanges were modified with yellow paint to resemble high-condition nestlings, parents preferred feeding them over nest mates wearing ''low-condition'' paler paint (Dugas 2009 ). In short, food is often limiting and the high incidence of brood reduction is probably facilitated by active parental discrimination against lesser-but-currently-viable offspring.
Similarly, earwig (Forficula auricularia) mothers hatch .90% of their 55 eggs and then supplement larval self-feeding with regurgitation. Roughly half of the larvae die from densitydependent causes, even in safe (lab) conditions, as shown by removing larvae (which reduces mortality) or preventing maternal subsidies (which increases it, Kölliker 2007). Offspring nutritional condition is revealed as a chemical signal through variation in cuticular hydrocarbons (2 alkanes and 1 alkene). If the cuticular hydrocarbons are extracted from larvae that have been either deprived (low food) or well fed (high food) and transferred to filter paper for blind presentation, mothers respond more strongly to the high-food stimuli (carrying more food and distributing it to a larger proportion of their broods, Mas et al. 2009 ). Setting aside feeding history for the moment, several provocative but underexplored directions present themselves. There is no reason to assume a priori that parents must choose either SoN or SoQ: They may be able to use both strategies. In a sequential version, parents might overproduce and aim initially to maintain the whole brood (via the SoN rule) while gathering updated information on foraging costs and other ecological components of the family resource budget (Forbes and Mock 1996) . By keeping everyone alive at least temporarily, the mutually compatible incentives for overproduction (resource tracking, insurance, and sib facilitation, Mock and Forbes 1995) are extended. If and when keeping an intact family becomes a luxury parents can no longer afford, a switch to SoQ could restrict investment toward the most promising subset (as proposed by Stamps et al. 1985) . Note that such a transition might require nothing more than a facultative change in the parents' priorities (e.g., McNamara and Houston 2009), and these adults are the only family members with direct access to the out-of-nest ecological information for its implementation. Assuming only that the early SoN phase does not erase sib-sib disparities to the point that brood reduction becomes prohibitively expensive, such a facultative switch might work well. (An alternative mechanism driven entirely by facultative offspring positioning [Kölliker and Richner 2004, p. 947] would offer flexibility but is tied only indirectly to external food availability via a trickle-down process.).
A simultaneous version of the SoN/SoQ combination might involve sexual conflict between 2 task-sharing parents (Lessells 1998) . A tiny but much-cited literature suggests that females of some avian species deliberately feed their smallest nestlings preferentially (Stamps et al. 1985; Gottlander 1987; Krebs 2002) , whereas their mates feed indiscriminately (passively favoring larger nest mates). Further exploration of such systems might consider the possibilities of (and reasons for) differing gender-specific responses (Lessells 1998) .
To this point, we have tacitly assumed that the cryptic information expressed in the signal captures an ultimate-level component of fitness (need or ''merit''), which is ostensibly what the signal receiver (parent) is most interested in learning (Searcy and Nowicki 2005) . How a neonate is imagined to assess its own potential reproductive value in formulating this signal is a physiological matter yet to be addressed. In parallel, the parent is assumed to get that critical information from the signal per se, a component that plausibly affixes value to the signals we seek to understand. However, this whole cluster of assumptions is relaxed in our third active-choice hypothesis, which we label Signal of Hunger (SoH) for parallelism but which resembles another neglected argument called the ''fuel-gauge hypothesis'' . Though a bit narrower than SoN and SoQ by virtue of being restricted to volitional signals (for their ephemeral properties), the beauty of SoH lies in its relative parsimony. Its basic premise, that the cryptic information expressed in solicitation signal strength is merely a proximate indication of fullness, enjoys an impressive empirical foundation from the hunger experiments. The key for converting this into an adaptive parenting tool lies in recognizing that the essential companion information on which parents evaluate fitness and make their life-history decisions is already available in the form of simple cues (body size, general vigor, development on schedule, etc.). These cues are something of an inconvenience for SoN and SoQ (being noncryptic, they dilute the value of the hypothetical signals' content), but they are integral to SoH. Meanwhile, both generations benefit from an ''honest'' transmission of information about which offspring are most ready for additional food added a slightly more complex version of this idea by incorporating digestive rates, which they call their ''efficiency-based model,'' but the central idea remains straightforward).
A facultative switch in parental responsiveness, this time based on cues, is easy to imagine and has the virtue of not requiring that offspring carry special insights into their own cryptic condition beyond what we recognize in ourselves as hunger. Instead it is the parents, perceiving that continued whole-brood survival is suboptimal (based on multiple information streams, including those deriving from the world beyond the nursery), that SoH proposes as resetting their response rule so as to ignore further solicitation signals from their least valuable offspring. Basically, when ecological cues dictate that parental foraging costs have become too steep to satisfy the growing brood's collective demand (e.g., depressed food availability, predator-inspired caution, elevated thermal costs, parental self-feeding requirements, etc.) and/or that brood-based cues indicate particular offspring as languishing (e.g., from genetic defects, parasites, etc.), parents adopt selective sales resistance. For this to work, parents must be capable of recognizing which individual offspring are no longer worthy of investment (see . Certainly, a vast literature documents adult ability to adjust foraging strategy to diverse environmental changes (Ydenberg 2007) , so the requisite assessment abilities are presumably widespread. Noting that their lab observations of size-dependent feeding and maternal preference for the smallest nestling in budgerigars (Melopsittacus undulatus) might be artifacts of captivity and ad libitum food, Stamps et al. (1985, p. 36) clearly anticipated this possibility, suggesting that parental solicitousness ''does not preclude a female's shifting her preference to the penultimate nestling and selectively starving her youngest nestling. Hence, complex feeding strategies favoring or maintaining small (young) nestlings are not only consistent with brood reduction but may be required if parents are to retain control over the conditions for brood reduction in asynchronous broods.'' To review, the SoH hypothesis provides a proximate-level explanation for functional solicitation signals, without requiring any cryptic information about offspring fitness potential (cf. SoN and SoQ). SoH signals are useful to the individual offspring by attracting the next parental delivery in rough proportion to its hunger. Surfeited nestlings commonly stop begging after a large meal, temporarily disinterested in food (mediated by feedback from crop proprioceptors, circulating blood sugars, hormones, etc.). Such an offspring may even have reached the point where its capacity for digesting food is reduced, further devaluing the signals, and/or the upper limit to begging may be set by parental willingness to respond (including sales resistance) based on assessment of offspring condition from cues. If the signals lose effectiveness on their targets, the incentive to escalate them wanes. No altruistic self--restraint is required, but SoH certainly can accommodate offspring integrating nest mate interests (from cues and/or enthusiasm for food), tuned by Hamilton's rule. Begging may thus be a sloppy expression of desire that nevertheless provides parents with useful information for their bookkeeping. As such, solicitation signals need not be costly but should be adjustable to parental delivery rates (reward schedules), attuned to the signaling milieu of nest mates, and generally truthful.
TESTING THE ARRAY OF ACTIVE-CHOICE HYPOTHESES
Immediately after sketching SoQ within the context of his broader theory of biological signals, Grafen (1990, p. 527) 1. We propose a moratorium on further replication of the hunger experiment, at least as an end unto itself. So far as we can tell, nobody doubts that animals intensify food solicitation signals when hungry, so let us move on. 2. We see that the first hurdle to cross concerns whether parents or offspring are primary controllers of provisioning and/or allocation . If the former, proceed to step 3; if the latter, these are the wrong models. The signaling aspects of offspring-controlled systems are addressed by Scramble-Begging or Sib-Negotiation approaches, whereas physical competition may eclipse signaling altogether in many cases. In some cases, determining which generation controls food may require nothing more than close observation; otherwise, experimental manipulations are often feasible. As a corollary, researchers should pay special attention to how such control often shifts from parents to offspring as the dependent young grow and mature. Many of the studies currently invoking SoN are dealing with nestling birds that had usurped much, if not all, of that control from hard-pressed parents. 3. When active parental choice seems indicated, we offer Table 1 as a point of entry.
In closing, we return to Trivers's point that offspring are not totally passive vessels into which investment is poured. Whereas we argue here that an improved understanding of solicitation signals requires greater consideration of life history than has been the case for active-signaling models to date, the reverse may also be true: Discussions of life history should take into account that dependent offspring are likely to play active, and potentially important, roles in shaping the decisions of care givers. This review has focused on the information content of offspring solicitations to controlling parents, but other modeling approaches (e.g., ScrambleBegging, Sibling Negotiation, etc.) cover other assumptions and the roles played by physical competition add to the complexity, as do the relative contributions from different sensory modalities. For example, the properties of morphological offspring signals differ substantially from those of fastchanging behavioral ones: Morphology is quite possibly better suited for encoding information about long-term condition (SoQ), whereas other components of the signaler's display passes information about more ephemeral aspects of cryptic condition (e.g., hunger). Overall, we may just be scratching the surface on this diverse and provocative topic.
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APPENDIX THE LIMITED EQUIVALENCY OF HUNGER AND NEED ''Your debutante just knows what you need, but I know what you want.'' (Bob Dylan, Memphis Blues Again).
Soon after the SoN model was expanded from its single-offspring introduction to accommodate multi-offspring families , practical questions arose about how to measure need operationally. This straddling problem between an idealized theoretical variable and some accessible metrics, common in theory-driven disciplines like behavioral ecology, was confronted clearly for begging by . As a first step, those authors proposed distinguishing between ''short-term need'' (i.e., hunger: the amount of food needed to achieve satiety) and ''long-term need'' (i.e., viability: the total amounts needed through successful fledging) for nestling yellow-headed blackbirds (Xanthocephalus xanthocephalus). Relabeling the problem did not solve it, of course (Price et al. used aspects of body size as their operational proxy for long-term need), but the logic obstacle was clearly identified (reviewed in Saino et al. 2000; Clark 2002; Wells 2003) . In a similar vein, adopted an intermediate step (their ''medium-term need'' called attention to possible cryptic adjustments of digestive efficiency) to add further complexity and realism. All else being equal, it makes some intuitive sense that offspring in lower condition may also be hungrier, at least on average, than those in higher condition. Variation in condition is surely not independent of past feeding history, including that of the very recent past. We see . At this point, therefore, it is premature to assume that variation in potential marginal fitness gain is usefully expressed in offspring signal variation. When a tiny nestling is removed from its nest and deprived of food for 90 min or so in a warm lab without nest mates, all else is probably as close to equal as can be achieved. Within-subject designs are powerful precisely because they minimize contributions from confounding factors (rivals, parasites, temperature, recent feeding history, etc.): The design's statistical virtue thus may unintentionally magnify hunger's impact on begging signals. But the inescapable fact remains that the subject's viability is virtually unchanged, even as it responds with escalated solicitations when stimulated. This exercise, therefore, cannot examine the combined effects of variation in need and variation in desire on fluctuations in signal strength because it addresses only desire and signaling. It has also been shown recently that the typical practice of artificially feeding these subjects to excess before commencing the deprivation period (a step intended to standardize fullness) simultaneously disrupts the normal digestion processes ), complicating interpretation of results. In any case, the reverse inference, that indicated hunger level is a key component in parental mechanisms for estimating offspring fitness potential, requires several more assumptions and thus is even more dubious. Statistically, one would like to know how well the easily measured test factor (deprivation time) and its correlated response (signaling) predict some aspect of the more elusive model component (say offspring probability of recruiting into the breeding population). In practice, the wildly mismatched time-frames (signaling being measured in seconds, hunger in hours, and recruitment after many months) frustrates resolution: slopes and r squares are not realistic goals. So we often end up relying on the intuitive premise with which we started, rather than on a rigorous empirical test. Pseudoprogress can be riskier than ignorance if its lures us into a cul-de-sac of complacency. The best option for now is likely to be deliberate caution. Meanwhile, renewed effort to seek alternative correlates of condition ) might prove fruitful, perhaps physiological ones that are simultaneously accessible to the signaler alone (hence cryptic) and can be shown to figure prominently in successful development. Immune responses to simulated pathogens (Saino et al. 2000) and inconspicuous ectoparasites (Christe et al. 1996) have been considered in this regard. Lastly, questions have been raised occasionally about whether it is even possible for parents to rescue lagging offspring with extra food, a matter that seems likely to vary both between species and as a function of the laggard's disadvantage (type and magnitude). Not all problems are soluble through additional food and some nestlings with seemingly simple nutritional deficiencies do not respond with compensatory growth when given more (Lepczyk and Karasov 2000; Brzęk and Konarzewski 2004) , whereas some of those that do ''catch up'' may show an assortment of deferred costs (Metcalfe and Monaghan 2001) .
With characteristically colorful prose, critically review empirical work on nestling begging displays inspired by ''signal of need'' model. They contrast Signals of Need (SoN) with 2 ''parsimonious alternative types of honest begging,'' Signals of Hunger (SoH) and Signals of Quality (SoQ). Starting with SoH, these are supposed to provide a proximate indication of offspring fullness. This, Mock et al. assure us, makes them distinct from SoN, which on their interpretation can only provide information about offspring reproductive value. Indeed, they strongly criticize existing studies for interpreting evidence that begging reflects hunger as support for SoN; as Mock et al. define them, hunger and need are wholly distinct. This criticism seems to us to be misplaced and based on a false dichotomy. In models of begging, ''need'' simply refers to the benefits that offspring stand to gain from eliciting additional investment (e.g., . These benefits may vary in relation to short-term need, that is, offspring hunger in Mock et al.'s terminology or in relation to long-term need, that is, offspring condition or reproductive value (e.g., . The logic of the handicap principle is applicable in the same way to both cases, and both have thus been interpreted as SoN; this is why so many authors have advanced evidence for the impact of short-term food deprivation on begging as support for SoN. It is of course interesting to explore how short-and long-term need respectively contribute to variation in begging intensity-see, for instance, , , and . Nevertheless, in our view, it is confusing to treat signals of short-term need as an entirely separate category of display from signals of long-term need, and it is misleading to suggest that existing theory focuses only the latter and ignores the former.
Turning to SoQ, Mock et al. suggest that begging may advertise merit rather than need and may serve to minimize parents' wasting investment on dependents with dim prospects. In our view, there is indeed a real difference between SoQ and SoN, and, because most discussion of begging has indeed focused on SoN, we see no harm in Mock et al.'s effort to revive interest in SoQ. Nevertheless, Mock et al.'s suggestion is not entirely novel- , for instance, have previously shown that models of begging can generate precisely the pattern Mock et al. predict in which parents provide more resources to chicks in better condition. Furthermore, we see 2 underlying problems with SoQ as a general hypothesis for the evolution of offspring begging. First, it is puzzling why parents would need to intervene actively in the process of food allocation in order to favor offspring in better condition, as SoQ suggests, when these offspring are superior competitors in any case. If the parents' goal is to sacrifice weaker offspring with poorer prospects, they could simply allow sibling competition to take its course (e.g., Kolliker and Richner 2004) . By contrast, SoN provides a stronger reason why parents should attempt to seize control of food allocation because this allows them to override differences in competitive ability and instead feed according to need. Second, although there are indeed phases of development during which infanticide is common, and offspring might benefit by dissuading parents from targeting them for ''disinvestment,'' this risk does not persist throughout chick growth . SoQ might thus play a role at certain key points in development, when the risk of infanticide looms large, but looks unconvincing as a general explanation for begging that persists throughout the rearing of the young.
As a final thought, we wonder how much is to be gained by setting up alternatives to original model of begging, which Mock et al. treat as the definitive statement of the SoN hypothesis. Godfray's analysis has served its purpose admirably by forcing empiricists to think more clearly about the details of interactions within the family. As a result, we now know that real animal families are far more complicated and interesting than his model assumed, with provisioning responses determined by parental life history, prenatal signals of parental quality, and partner behavior as well as by begging intensity. Equally, Godfray's model has stimulated many refinements of the theory, with more recent models attempting to incorporate some of the complexities revealed by empirical studies of parent-offspring interaction, from Godfray's own 1995 model of competitive begging , to analyses of sibling negotiation, prenatal influences, and partial begging. In our view, future work should focus on incorporating these complexities into framework for thinking about family life rather than on replacing SoN with artificial alternatives. Royle in the following referred to as ''MDS'', point out some weaknesses and inconsistencies in begging research, and they convincingly place signaling of need and signaling of quality at eye level as 2 competing hypotheses for the evolution of offspring begging signals. Hopefully, the 2 hypotheses will be placed to balanced tests in the future. They further point out that the widespread hunger experiments are not tests of signals of ''need'' as envisaged by Godfray (1991) (see for previous, albeit different, criticism) because hunger is a poor predictor of offspring fitness returns on investment. They propose instead to treat hunger-dependent begging as conceptually separate proximate ''signals of hunger.'' The relation between proximate control of begging by hunger and ultimate causes of condition dependence of begging by need/quality is critical and possibly also at the heart of some of the confusion surrounding the concept of ''need'', I agree. However, I don't think hunger effects on begging are as detached from evolutionary theory as the authors suggest. and others assumed in their models a single begging-provisioning interaction between an offspring and a parent. Under such simplistic conditions, more hungry offspring would actually often stand to gain more in terms of fitness from the single expected provisioning, and hunger would be a useful proxy for need. The core limitation of hunger as operational definition for need in experimental research is the characteristic repetitiveness of parent-offspring interactions in nature. The highly dynamic nature of hunger effects on offspring begging, begging effects on parental provisioning, and provisioning effects on offspring hunger makes hunger a highly transient state, concealing in very short time any potential relation between hunger and offspring fitness gains.
But even then, we don't have to exile hunger effects on begging to a purely proximate realm. Hunger experiments measure how offspring behaviorally react to variation in food provisioning at a given moment in time (Kö lliker 2003) . This causal relation was termed ''effect of supply on demand-or ESD-mechanism'' Kö lliker 2003) or ''demand reaction norm'' . The slope of the demand reaction norm describes how begging encodes information about variation in recent food intake and comprises the proximate mechanisms that translate food intake into variation in begging (e.g., digestive efficiency, genetic variation, hormonal or ontogenetic changes; see . Together with the parental supply reaction norm, the demand reaction norm determines the levels of provisioning and begging in the repeated interactions (Kö lliker 2003) and plays a role in mediating the behavioral dynamics between parents and offspring (Dobler and Kö lliker 2009). Finally, like reaction norms in general, the demand reaction norm is a potentially heritable and evolving trait , maybe even one of key interest in the evolution of family interactions.
Thus, I would not go so far as to request a ''moratorium on the hunger experiment'' (MDS). Hunger experiments are often (and reasonably) the first step into the study of parentoffspring interactions in less well-studied organisms in which begging is not as obvious to the human observer as in birds. In such systems, they remain an essential tool to identify candidate begging traits. Furthermore, the ''at least as an end to itself'' part in MDS's proposal seems essential to me, although the authors do not elaborate on it. Little is known about causal agents of interindividual variability in demand reaction norms or how selection operates on them. For example, is there heritable variation, ontogenetic shifts, and growth/learning/environmental effects on the slope of the demand reaction norm? Is the demand reaction norm expected to evolve differently if begging evolves as a signal of need as opposed to a signal of quality or as a means of scramble competition? Does sibling rivalry select for more or less hunger-sensitive begging? Such questions have not been broadly enough studied-neither theoretically nor experimentally. In my opinion, hunger experiments should continue to play an important role in research on begging but properly applied and interpreted: Hunger may usually not reflect need. The hunger effect on begging is a measurement of an offspring trait-the slope of the demand reaction norm.
Most scientists in the field probably would agree with MDS that testing for behavioral control (bc) is of prime importance in future research on begging . Theoretically, bc is a model assumption needed to define which party makes active choices, that is, to which degree parents impose selection on offspring or vice versa. However, empirically, it is not so obvious what kind of trait bc should be and how we should test or observe this potentially cryptic trait. As a cautionary note, the term shares some of the properties that rendered need ambiguous and misleading. Like need, ''bc'' is theoretically straightforward, intuitively appealing, and empirically difficult to grasp, test, and quantify. While I agree with MDS that careful observation is essential, I doubt that observation alone will be sufficient in many cases. Manipulative experiments will be required to causally disentangle bc and to generalize beyond the limits of the behavioral repertoire of a given species [see Hinde et al. (2010) for an approach to disentangle bc based on coadaptation logic]. I think this will be important to avoid erroneously assigning bc based on easily observable behaviors that are interpreted as control behaviors on intuitive grounds.
Begging for a better future: how far can behavioral ecologists go without specifying mechanisms?
Mock et al.'s critical review of the ''honest begging'' literature is certainly welcome and constructive. We agree that there are some problems with Signal of Need (SoN) including its interactions with Signal of Quality (SoQ) , and the fact that it makes opposing predictions for different fitness functions ) and ''assumes away'' the dynamic nature of parent-offspring interactions . We are obviously pleased with the endorsement of the fuel gauge model (FGM; but feel that its presentation as a version of the Signaling of Hunger idea (SoH), that is, as an alternative to SoN, gives it a different interpretation than originally intended. The distinction may look subtle but it is critical: In our view, the field does not require another normative model but crucially requires mechanistic models connecting the theoretical terms ''need'' and ''quality'' with biological reality. The FGM is therefore not an alternative to SoN, but a mechanistic model explaining how food deprivation can cause a gradual increase in need (i.e., in the marginal fitness value of receiving extra resources). The first component of the FGM is that sated (full) offspring have a need level of zero simply because they are not receptive to being fed, so food cannot be converted into offspring fitness. However, this food-receptivity component, termed ''being ready for additional food'' by Mock et al., is not sufficient to explain further increases in begging with food deprivation (receptivity alone could be indicated by an allor-none signal or cue). This is where the second component of the FGM becomes essential. The reason that an ''almost empty'' offspring is needier than a ''half empty'' offspring is that although they may be equally ready to receive a meal, the almost empty one is at greater risk of becoming completely empty, which might temporarily stop its ''digestive engine'' converting food into growth .
Alternatively, ''efficiency-based'' models suggest that fullness reduces digestive efficiency, providing a different functional reason for why food-deprived offspring will gain more fitness from being fed . Importantly, specifying the alternative mechanisms through which SoN may work enables us to return to ultimate reasoning with relevant experimental results . If the justified criticism of being ''content with SoN'' leads to this integrating approach, as we suggest, we are not really ''expanding from signal of need,'' but breaking it down to concrete examples that can be studied and understood at the mechanistic level. In contrast, using ''hunger'' or ''fullness'' without clarifying their relation to fitness might not take us much further than need or quality.
We greatly sympathize with Mock et al.'s call to move beyond the ''hunger experiment'' and the honest signaling preoccupation but feel that expanding to SoH or SoQ may not be the best way. In theory, begging should be adjusted in relation to both differential costs (quality) and benefits (need), but offspring must assess those through proximate factors, such as digestive physiology, hormonal levels, competitive state, and past experience. Understanding these mechanisms is necessary for decoding the message conveyed by begging and assessing the extent to which begging is honest and parental response to it is adaptive. On the bright side, it seems that the field is already moving in this direction with an increasing number of studies into the genetic and phenotypic mechanisms of parent-offspring communication (e.g., Grodzinski et al. 2008; Lotem 2009, 2010; Hinde et al. 2009; . We should perhaps recall that the honest-signaling revolution was mainly a conceptual one. It provided a stable solution for the problem of cheating, facilitating the use of normative models like those used for animal foraging to study animal communication. Now that behavioral ecologists gradually stopped asking whether foraging is optimal and are instead using optimality as a working hypothesis for studying the evolution of behavioral mechanisms (recently reviewed by McNamara and Houston 2009), we can stop asking whether begging is honest as a goal in itself. Instead, we can use working hypotheses about costly signaling and evolutionary stability (implying some general concept of honesty) to study the mechanisms that make offspring begging and parental response to it adaptive. present a very timely review of ideas on the fascinating topic of offspring begging, which is a field of research that has perhaps lost its way over the course of the last 2 decades. They very usefully clarify and separate out theoretical arguments in a number of key areas. In doing so, they perhaps fail to provide a complete answer, but they nevertheless provide a useful framework for discussion, which is used here to further explore certain arguments.
Sibling altruism is included in the scheme presented by Table 1 ) but only as part of the Signal of Need (SoN) hypothesis. There is also little mention of the central role played by sibling relatedness on variation in begging effort across species, either as a result of extrapair activity (e.g., Briskie et al. 1994) or brood parasitism (e.g., ). In the absence of any other hypothesis, these are often seen as some of the strongest bits of evidence we have in support of the SoN hypothesis. However, the alternative Signal of Quality hypothesis [and perhaps even the Signal of Hunger (SoH) hypothesis] contains exactly the same potential for sibling altruism and so could explain these findings equally well. As with direct sibling competition , any begging strategy that benefits an offspring over its siblings can (and will) evolve so as to reflect different average levels of kinship, whatever the hypothesis behind such adaptive begging behavior.
The SoH hypothesis is unfortunately not very well developed by in terms of the adaptive basis for such a mechanistic explanation. It seems clear that digestive constraints represent the only reason why parents would care about offspring stomach fullness (i.e., hunger) per se. Digestive efficiency is assumed to decline with stomach fullness, creating the classic diminishing fitness returns curve for successive parental feeding of the same offspring. However, recent research has shown reduced digestive efficiency only when nestlings are approaching satiation ). Even more worrying for the SoH hypothesis is that nestlings in the wild almost never get that close to satiation, and digestive efficiency does not vary within natural ranges of food intake in the way that begging does . It therefore appears that food is absorbed at a largely similar rate whichever offspring the parents feed. So, begging must be being used to signal stomach fullness because it relates to some other graded physiological or developmental need. At which point, the distinction between a SoH and a SoN becomes much less clear. severely underestimate the potential utility of what they call ''hunger experiments.'' When correctly carried out, such experiments are crucial for any real understanding of the evolution of begging via parent-offspring conflict. This is because they allow an assessment of the shape (i.e., elevation and slope) of individual offspring demand functions. Alongside, similar assessments of individual parent supply functions, these can be treated as ''behavioral reaction norms'' and quantitative genetics methods applied to investigate the coevolution of parent and offspring strategies in natural populations (see ). This would appear to be one of the most promising and exciting avenues for future research in this field, and so it would be a shame to discourage such basic data collection.
Properly carried out hunger experiments are also crucial in explorations of important topics, such as offspring digestion (see above) and learning (e.g., Kedar et al. 2000; Budden and Wright 2005 ). One such hand-feeding study by Wright et al. (2011) provides key findings in an informative area of begging research that is largely neglected by , which is that senior and junior nestlings within the same brood possess quite different shaped demand functions. Such cryptic strategies in nestling behavior bring into question the suggestion by that it is enough to simply observe whether parents or offspring are ''in control'' of provisioning and food allocation. The same problem arises from cryptic parental strategies, such as maternal effects and ''laissez faire'' allocation strategies, which can manipulatively define the arena for begging competition between siblings. Hence, apparent behavioural control at the point of food delivery may not always tell us very much about the specific evolutionary resolution of parent-offspring conflict being observed.
As this short commentary hopefully illustrates, the review by has the potential to breath new life into the study of begging by opening up old arguments to fresh debate and by encouraging new research directions to answer old questions. We sought to reopen and broaden discussions of offspring solicitation, offering 2 alternatives to the reigning Signal of Need (SoN) paradigm. Hinde and Godfray's view that ''most available evidence'' appears to support SoN is beyond doubt but whether that indicates a healthy science or a worrisome narrowing of active-choice possibilities is less clear. After all, landslide elections occur whenever just 1 party is on the ballot. In this case, however, considerable data already support Signal of Quality (SoQ), so that idea has a well-deserved place at the table. Parental favoritism toward stronger offspring is a perfectly reasonable complement to the widespread lifehistory strategy of initial overproduction. Lab conditions with ad libitum food and zero predation may essentially eliminate foraging costs and lead parents to ''invest'' differently, but taxa that evolved outdoors routinely face tougher choices. In solving their real-life problems, parents are likely to use any reliable information they can find, with signals being only one source category. We should remain open to factors overlooked in early models, freely adjusting theory to nature, not vice versa.
Of the active-choice hypotheses considered in our review, one was cast in elegant equations; the others, to date only as verbal arguments. (Actually, Grafen's SoQ-the simplest handicap application-needs only a kinship constraint added to the costs to move from sexual signaling over to begging.) And we agree with several commentary authors that begging models should be dynamic, so all current models fall short. To be very clear, we can easily imagine how resource-rich parents and cooperative sibships ''might'' profit within a SoN system, but we see little in nature to suggest that this heart-warming possibility occurs regularly.
We certainly appreciate what Wright called the ''central role'' of kinship in limiting selfishness (e.g., in SoQ, see our figure  2a ), but that limitation is finite as specified explicitly by Hamilton's rule.
We are glad to see Grodzinski et al. distinguish their Fuel Gauge Model from our Signal of Hunger (SoH). The latter was derived independently, but we chose to err on the side of giving fuel gauge due precedence for any perceived overlap. Their point on efficient functioning of the ''digestive engine'' clarifies things nicely. Less happily, several commentators misread our call for a moratorium on overly simplistic hunger experiments as a universal ban on hunger, period. We made it clear (APPENDIX) that hunger can factor somehow into Godfray's ultimate version of need. But how? Far too many workers have used only short-term measures (food deprivation) and then plugged that in as the SoN model's ultimate variable. Showing repeatedly that hungrier babies escalate is of no further value ''as an end unto itself'', but Kö lliker may be right that we should have elaborated further. If assessing how hunger affects signaling is merely a convenient first step toward subsequent linkage with compelling fitness measures (presumably what Wright dubbed its ''potential utility''), we have no problem, but that key second step is often missing. Meanwhile, Wright's assertion that satiety ''almost never'' occurs must remain an open issue. We have frequently observed senior egret and sparrow sibs ingesting so much that they cease begging and even nap through subsequent meals.
Kilner and Johnstone seem intent on framing our distinction between Godfray's ''need'' and empiricists' ''hunger'' in starkly polarized terms (''wholly distinct''), but we were not so extreme (see ''limited equivalency''; box 1). Their more interesting question (why should adults actively promote brood reduction?) is easily answered: Parents sometimes gain from favoring their strongest offspring via various measures (many well shy of infanticide). The active-choice phase of parental care begins well before physical sibling competition becomes effective, so parents stand to conserve valuable investment (Grafen's image of not wasting food on a lost cause).
We agree enthusiastically with Kilner and Johnstone's closing point that Godfray's model has served its purpose admirably. Good models are tools for promoting clear thinking, but the actual thinking that ensues is not the modeler's job. They can only lead a horse to water. In our opinion, much of the empirical work ''supporting'' SoN was incautious and uncritical about various key assumptions, especially parental life-history objectives and whether sibling interests are ''sufficiently'' aligned to drive the evolution of an SoN system. Science proceeds best when trying to falsify predictions from an array of alternative hypotheses, rather than enshrining just one. The points we raised in our review may prove incorrect, as we shall see when they are tested. Who knows at this point whether a proximate and ephemeral phenomenon like hunger will turn out to track fitness consequences adequately? Or whether a given reproductive effort will require parental sacrifice of some offspring to enhance sibling prospects? We do not. But these are important questions, answers to which cannot be provided by assumptions. The empiricist's job is to consider alternatives without bias before seeking answers. For family dynamics, the inequality at the heart of Hamilton's rule shows that outcomes may tip either way. Our review proposes that behavioral ecologists interested in offspring solicitations must consider diverse functional explanations. Sometimes-within or between taxa-the signals may truly be begging (SoN); other times, boasting (SoQ). And sometimes they may be just a bit of bookkeeping (SoH). We hope readers will pursue falsification criteria for all 3 hypotheses and devise additional ones as well.
